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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effect of Credit Guarantees on R&D Investment of 
SMEs in Korea 
 
Korean government has invested significant amount of resources through credit guarantee 
funds to promote SMEs survival, performance and R&D investment. This study attempts to 
identify determinants of provision of credit guarantees and estimate their effects on firms 
R&D expenditures. The relationship between duration of credit and firm’s survival and 
performance is also investigated. Account is made for heterogeneity by various 
characteristics of firms when looking at credit guarantee and in-house R&D investment 
relationships. This study results in identification of factors that enhances efficiency of funds 
and their effects on firms’ R&D investment behavior. It enables feedback effects on the public 
funds selection of firms guaranteed. A number of policy measures are proposed to promote a 
better balance between public and private investments to reduce the risk of business failure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Despite the integral role of SME (Small and Medium Enterprises) in Korean economy, most 
SMEs were in financially difficult positions with circulation of the cash flow. Accordingly, the 
Korean government has been investing in funds to boost these SMEs’ economic activities. 
However, the evaluation of governmental funds’ performance has not been carried out 
effectively. In order to manage such funds effectively, comprehensive evaluation procedures 
are necessary to be performed and the resulting feedback information be provided to better 
select firms eligible for the future governmental funds. By analyzing the failure factors of firms, 
we identify factors determining the funds efficiency in the performance and its impacts on 
survival, performance and R&D investment of the firms. 
Most of the previous studies dealing with the evaluation of governmental investments have 
considered the output performances only. For instance, the report from the SMBA (Small and 
Medium Business Administration in Korea, 2002) has shown the performance evaluation 
using an AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process). With the same methodology, Yurdakula and 
Tansel (2004) proposed a credit evaluation model for the banks to determine the credibility of 
the manufacturing firms in an effort to measure their long-term profitability. Frei and Harker 
(1999) used AHP to measure the performance of the aggregate process of the banking industry. 
But these studies have not considered the effects of input factors. Some other studies (Banker 
et. al, 2004; Martinsons et. al, 1999; Milis and Mercken, 2004) have used BSC (Balanced 
Score Card) in order to evaluate the performance of the investments or projects. Kang et al. 
(2008) and Oh et al. (2009) used regression analysis and matching methods to evaluate the 
effects of credit guarantee on survival and performance of firms.   
The results of the performance evaluation in the previous studies do not provide enough 
feedback information to predict the worthy credit recipients in future. In this study we analyze 
data from 45,749 Korean firms which requested credit guarantees from credit guarantee funds, 
during the period 2001 to 2004. We analyze the relationship between credit provision and 
firms R&D investment in several interrelated steps. First this study finds systematic 
heterogeneity by characteristics of recipients such as industrial sector, technology level, size 
groups, age, ownership and location of firms. Second, based on longitudinal data from 
technology-based start-ups we identify factors determining the level of credit guarantee and in-
house R&D investment. In particular the emphasis is on the interaction between credit 
guarantee and in-house R&D investment and their impacts on survival and performance of 
SMEs. The results is used to suggest policy recommendations for targeting policy measures to 
promote a better balance between public and private investment components to reduce the 
need for credit guarantee and risk of business failure. 
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This study is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an overview of the public funds 
invested in SMEs. In Section 3, we propose a research design. In Section 4, the proposed 
methodology is applied to evaluating credit supply to SME in Korea. Section 5 summarizes 
the results and provides suggestions for further research. 
 
2. REVIEW OF R&D AND SME POLICIES  
2.1 Public and private R&D policy  
The development of equilibrium or neo-classical models of fiscal policy has, among other 
things, brought attention to the role of public investment as a productive input to private 
production1. Within these models, certain types of public investment, broadly referred to as 
infrastructure, are conjectured to raise the productivity of private capital and labor and so raises 
private investment. Arrow and Kurz (1970) studied public investment, the rate of return and 
optimal fiscal policy. Arping et al. (2010) compares credit guarantees versus co-funding in 
public initiatives to support entrepreneurs. Aschauer (1989a) discusses productivity of public 
expenditure while Aschauer (1989b) refers to this as the crowding in effect of public 
investment. In the later study which examines the response of private investment to changes in 
public investment, he finds quite strong evidence in support of long-run positive impact on 
private investment. He interprets this as evidence of a productive and complementary role for 
public investment. David et al. (2000) reviewed the econometric evidence on the 
complementarity or substitutability of public R&D for private R&D. 
A useful framework for understanding how public R&D affects R&D funding decisions in the 
private sector is provided by an adaptation of a model of firm-level investment behavior. To 
our knowledge, such a framework was first employed for this purpose by Howe and 
McFetridge (1976). It postulates that, at each point in time, an array of potential R&D 
investment projects is available. The firm is assumed to rationally consider the expected cost 
and benefit streams for each project, in order to calculate its expected rate of return. Under 
certain conditions, these can be thought of as internal rates of return and therefore used by the 
firm in question to rank the associated projects in descending order of anticipated yield, 
thereby forming its marginal rate of return schedule. 
The firm faces a marginal cost of capital schedule, which reflects the opportunity cost of 
investment funds at different levels of R&D investment. As the volume of R&D investment is 
increased the firm will have to move from financing projects with internally generated funds to 
                                                     
1 Baxter and King (1993) elaborate with fiscal policy in general equilibrium. The equilibrium approach to fiscal 
policy is discussed at length in Aschauer (1988) and Barro (1989).  
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calling upon external (equity and debt) funding. This must be so even were it the case that all 
of the firm’s R&D investment remained financed out of retained earnings; at the margin, 
expansion of the R&D investment budget would force the firm to turn to external financing for 
its tangible capital acquisitions. 
 
2.2 Development of SME policy in Korea 
There has been considerable change in the orientation of the Korean government policies with 
respect to SMEs over time. In the 1960s and early 1970s, in the pursuit of rapid economic 
development, and in the absence of market and other institutions capable of providing support 
to small and new firms, SMEs were relatively neglected. Public policy was directed to 
providing credit and other support to those firms, perhaps originally small, but which had 
managed to succeed in export markets and hence which had grown to be very large. Firms and 
sectors were assigned ambitious growth quotas. Failure to meet these quotas could result in the 
loss of access to highly subsidized policy loans or other penalties. SMEs, on the other hand, 
had access primarily only to credit on the informal market at high interest rates.  
When in the 1970s the government’s development plan assigned top priority to heavy and 
chemical industries and exports, SMEs were put in an even more unfavorable position. A 
SME bank had been set up, but loan repayment rates were quite low, transaction costs very 
high and hence making little difference for SMEs in general. Even in the late 1960s, however, 
some seeds were set for the beginnings of an effective SME support system. KCGF was 
created to facilitate the provision of bank credit to SMEs. A special trading corporation was set 
up for assisting SMEs in export market. In 1979 the Small and Medium Industry Promotion 
Corporation was established for the purpose of providing technical assistance and training 
programs to SMEs.  
In the 1980s the shift toward a stronger SME support system and policies aimed at 
overcoming the earlier neglect of SMEs accelerated. The new constitution stipulated that the 
protection and promotion of SMEs should be included among the basic responsibilities of the 
government. A series of laws was passed to turn this broad objective into a body of law. Many 
specific-purpose credit funds were set up, for example, to help rural industries, to foster 
venture capital designed to assist small high tech startups, to foster collective or cooperative 
activities among SMEs, to help older SMEs update their technology, and even to help existing 
SMEs to relocate some of their operations abroad. An ambitious system for identifying and 
providing various kinds of support for “promising SMEs” was established, and both 
commercial banks and rural local banks were required to allocate minimum specified 
percentages of their loans to SMEs. Such quotas were even forced on nonbank financial 
5 
 
institutions, such as insurance companies. Various tax breaks to SMEs for special purposes 
were also implemented.   
The 1980s and 1990s have also seen a proliferation of technical research centers, institutes, 
standards centers, productivity centers, and a design and packaging center organized as either 
government or nonprofit agencies. Although not developed exclusively for use by SMEs, 
several of these agencies were in fact fairly heavily used by SMEs. Moreover, as the internal 
capabilities of LSEs increased with accumulated experience and staff additions, LSEs had less 
need to rely on those external agencies, such as the Korean Overseas Trading Association 
(KOTRA), which had earlier catered almost exclusively to LSEs. Some of the new centers 
have also proliferated into networks of either regional general-purpose agencies or national but 
highly specialized ones. 
Nevertheless, because of the large number of programs and agencies, the lack of data on both 
their benefits and costs, and the likelihood that their effects would appear only in the relatively 
long run, the proper evaluation of these programs and organizations is quite a challenge. Kim 
and Nugent (1999), as part of a broader multi-country study, made a qualitative attempt to 
evaluate the usefulness of these programs in a relatively small sample of mostly exporting 
SMEs. Four different subsectors were chosen to reflect different environmental conditions. 
While no attempt was made to obtain cost of program data, the use of each of three different 
types of SME support was investigated. Lee (2006) analysis the effectiveness of government’s 
occupational skills development strategies for SMEs. The effectiveness of public credit 
guarantees in the Japanese loan market is investigated by Uesugi et al. (2010). 
In addition to the above studies, the issue of SMEs policy constraints is discussed in Nugent 
and Yhee (2002), Luck (2002) and Laeven (2002). Park et al. (2013) looked into the credit 
spreads. Ono et al. (2013) investigate whether lending relationships is beneficial or harmful for 
public credit guarantees. Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) ask whether there was a credit crunch in 
East Asia. The credit crunch and availability of credit to SMEs is also investigated in Hancock 
and Wilcox (1998). Domac and Ferri (1998), Dong (1998) and Borensztein and Lee (2002) 
investigate the impacts of financial crisis and credit crunch on firms under the Asian financial 
crisis. Kim (1999) asks if credit channel was a key monetary transmission mechanism 
following the financial crisis. Moon and Sohn (2005) use intelligence approach for effective 
management of governmental funds for SMEs.  
 
2.3 The credit guarantee system and its development in Korea 
Credit guarantee system was first introduced in 1961 in Korea for the purpose of alleviation of 
the financial difficulties of SMEs. Nowadays, there are two public credit guarantee funds in 
6 
 
Korea, Korea Credit Guarantee fund (KCGF) and Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund 
(KOTEC). They were founded to achieve different policy goals. However, the goal of 
KOTEC was not executed thoroughly although it was established to foster technology-based 
firms and to promote technological innovation. The amount of guarantee provided based on 
technology evaluation has been less than 10% of total amount of guarantee until 2004.  
Even though both credit guarantee institutions are established to support SMEs, they have 
guaranteed relatively small LSEs, especially during the 1997 economic crisis, as well. In 1998, 
Korean SMEs were severely shocked at economic crisis caused by deficiency of foreign 
currency. Interest rates soared continuously and many enterprises went bankrupt. 
Consequently, as a measure to support SMEs who suffered heavily from lack of finance, the 
amount of credit guarantee increased as well. The balance of guarantee came up to 45.7 trillion 
won2, or 6.1% of GDP, in 2003 as shown in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Capital funds for credit guarantee services consist mainly of contributions from the 
government and financial institutions. From a view of opponents, excessive guarantees hinder 
growth of the financial market causing inefficiency in resource allocation and negative effects 
in the long term. Moreover, there are innate factors to provoke moral hazard in the guarantee 
system. Since the present guarantee rate is too high, 85%, exceeding the international rate, 60-
70%, it results in reduced incentives by lenders to investigate applicants thoroughly.  
There are few recent studies evaluating the effects of credit guarantee policy on survival and 
performance of SMEs in Korea. These studies use firm level data from both credit guarantee 
institutes covering the period 2000-2004. Kang et al. (2008) analyzed the relationship between 
credit guarantee, the survival and performance of guaranteed firm. Results suggest that credit 
guarantee frequency enhanced firm performance but the effects of guarantee amount was 
ambiguous. Thus, credit guarantee satisfied only partially its goals in supporting SMEs. Oh et 
al. (2009) used matching techniques to compare guaranteed and non-guaranteed firms with 
respect to different performance indicators. Results suggest that credit guarantee influenced the 
size and survival rate of firms but not their R&D and investment.  
 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN  
Our analysis is based on information on 45,749 firms which requested credit guarantees from 
one or both of two credit guarantee funds during the period from 2000 to 2004. All applicants 
provided basic information as well as financial data of previous years.  
                                                     
2 Averagely US $1 = 1,050 won in 2013 sourced by the Bank of Korea 
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We start exploring our data by looking at descriptive evidence. In Table 2, the age (Age) 
variable indicates the age of firms since their establishment. Also, we obtain information on 
whether the firms has received guarantee, the amount (CGamount) received and its frequency 
(CGnumber). A number of firm characteristics are used in determination of provision of credit 
guarantee and the amount. These are related to the size of firm or number of employees 
(Employee), and technology capability such as the CEOs education (CEOedu), firms 
development cost (Inhouse), new technology based firms (NTBF), and holdings of patents 
(Patent). The financial variables include total assets (Totassets), intangible share of assets 
(Intangshare), liability (Dratio), stockholder’s equity (Totshequ), net income (Netincome) and 
income taxes (Tax). In addition interaction of credit guarantee amount and net income is used 
to capture nonlinearity in the relationship. 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
The analysis is conducted in form of two regressions; one is about determinants of credit 
guarantee and the second is related to determinants of firms’ R&D investment. Table 3 shows 
a large dispersion in credit guarantee amount, in-house R&D investment, assets, net income 
and taxes. All explanatory variables are positively correlated with each of the two dependent 
variables. The correlations between the explanatory variables shows that with a few exceptions 
most of the correlation coefficients are below 0.50 suggesting no serious problem of 
multicollinearity. The dependent variable amount of credit guarantee is highly correlated with 
total assets (0.56) and share of equity (0.51). These two variables are main variables explaining 
variations in the amount of credit guarantee. The second dependent variable, in-house R&D, is 
highly correlated with its determinants including intangible share of assets (0.30), patents 
(0.22), total assets (0.45), employment (0.30), and share of equity (0.43). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL  
In this paper, we analyze the effects of public funds on SMEs R&D investment which 
proceeds in two steps. First, it is analyzed by identifying what determines the amount of credit 
guarantee. Second, the effect of credit guarantee on determinants of firms’ R&D using net 
income after and before tax is estimated for the firms which received credit guarantee.  
 
4.1 Determinants of Credit Guarantee amount 
In order to identify the determinant of the credit guarantee amount measured in the first part in 
log form (lCGamount ), a simple relation accounting for various cohorts and time effects is 
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specified as follows. The model is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) method: 
(1)
2
2
0 age int patent patent NTBF NTBF age
duplication duplication logtotalasset deratio ceo
intangshare D D
                           D ltotassets deratio ceoedu
                
angiblelCGamount age ageb b b b b b
b b b b
= + + + + +
+ + + +
i i i i
time size i industry             D  D D location Di i i location i
i i i i
ub b b b+ + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
where nduplicatioD  is a dummy variable identifying which firms are provided duplicated 
credit guarantees. Duplication is defined by the firm applicants receive guarantees from both 
credit institutes. The intangible asset share is considered in this model. We also estimated 
firm’s technological characteristic by using patent and NTBF dummy variables and considered 
size, time, location, and industrial sector dummy variables as well. The location is divided into 
16 subsections and compared to Seoul as reference location, which stands for location 1. The 
size has 5 categories is constructed based on the number of employees. The time is classified 
from 2001 through 2004 using 2001 as a reference year. At last, in the case of industrial sector, 
we used a list of industry specific three-digit codes as seen in Table 4. In Table 4 several sub-
sectors, in total 14, with industrial codes from 242 to 722, represent the relatively new venture 
industries, and the other data do represent old and conventional industries.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
This equation considers the relationship between the amount of credit guarantee and features 
of firms. It includes not only financial data but also non-financial data such as age, size, 
location, possession of patents, period of application and industrial sector in which firms 
belong to. In case of financial data, fixed assets and sales are introduced since they are used as 
objective standards. Inclusion of these group effects in the model lead the model to be 
considered as a fixed effects (least squares dummy variable) model. The larger between groups 
are accounted for, but the minor within group variations are neglected.  
 
4.2 Determinants of in-house R&D investment 
In this section, in order to estimate the effect of credit guarantee on the determinants of firms’ 
R&D, we investigate the guarantee influence on the firms’ R&D investment by considering 
the predicted credit guarantee amount as another explanatory variable. In particular, two cases 
of net incomes after tax and before tax are treated for the determinants of firms’ own R&D. 
Here the estimated amount of credit guarantee is included in the set of regressors to analyze the 
effect of credit guarantee on R&D investment conditional on other control variables as: 
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(2) 
2
2
0 age int patent patent NTBF NTBF age
duplication duplication logtotalasset deratio lnetincome
ln intangshare D D
                   D ltotassets deratio lnetincome
              
angiblel house age ageb b b b b b
b b b b
= + + + + +
+ + + +
ltotshequ Plcgamount Plcgalneti ceo
i i i i
time size i industry
         ltotshequ+ plcgalneti + ceoedu
                        D  D D location Di i i location i
i i i i
plcgamount
u
b b b b
b b b b
∧ ∧
+ +
+ + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
where plcgamount
∧
is the predicted value of credit guarantee amount and plcgalneti
∧
is the 
product of the predicted value of credit guarantee and log net income. The dependent variable, 
which is the sum of ordinary and development costs, is employed as a proxy indicating the 
total R&D investment of firms. Other explanatory variables are the same as those are related to 
credit receipt analysis. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
5.1 Specification and estimation tests 
Two models are specified and estimated, a model to identify the determinants of level credit 
guarantee received by a firm and another determinants of its in-house R&D investment. The 
former is an explanatory variable affecting the later in which they are estimated recursively.  
The credit guarantee model is specified by identifying a number of continuous variables such 
as total assets and ordinary R&D costs, some characteristics of the firms such as age of firm 
and its square, share of intangible assets, patents, technology conditions, indebtedness and 
duplicated sources of credit guarantee receipt. In addition several categorical variables are 
included in the specification such as the level of education of CEO, year of observation, size of 
firms, location and industrial classifications. Various F-tests suggest that these variables should 
be included in the specification of the model. The coefficient of determination R2 indicate that 
54% of the variations in the amount if credit guarantee is explained by this model. 
The in-house R&D investment model is explained by total assets, predicted credit guarantee 
amount, net income, interaction of guarantee amount and net income as continuous variables, 
and several share variables like intangible share, equity share, indebtedness share, age and its 
square, patent, technology, frequency and duplication of credit guarantee, as well as education, 
year, size, location, and industry group category variables. Again various F-tests show that 
these variables should be included in the specification. The model is estimated by using net 
income before and after tax. The fits of model suggest that 57% of the variation in R&D 
investment is explained by the models. 
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5.2 Credit guarantees 
For the analysis of the relationship between credit and firm’s performance, we find systematic 
heterogeneity by characteristics such as industrial sector, technology level, firm size, age, 
ownership and location of firms. Taking into account the distribution of the firms with respect 
to their age, we find that most of firms taking credit guarantee are young companies. The 
cumulative percentages with respect to time are 55.7% for less than 5 years, 82.3% for below 
10 years, 93.5% for less than 15 years, and 97.4% for below 20 years, which shows that young 
firms are main receivers of credit guarantee. We can identify that the firms which have just 
begun their business have small credit guarantee but the companies with ages of 3 to 5 receive 
the most credit guarantee fund supplied by KOTEC.  
The cumulative distribution of firms receiving credit guarantee by size of firms is also 
computed. The percentage share is divided into five size classes measured by number of 
employees. The very small size with less than 20 employees accounts for 69.7% of the sample. 
The second small size class with less than 50 employees accumulated reached 90.2%. Taking 
into account for the medium size 3 up to 100 employees, the cumulative distribution reached 
96.7%. Accumulation of the remaining large and very large sizes with maximum of 300 and 
more than 300 employees, respectively, accounts for 99.7% and 100.0% of the cumulative 
distribution of firms. 
Results based on equation (1) showed the factors which determine the credit guarantee amount. 
R2 fitness measure of this model is 0.54 and overall, this model gives statistically highly 
significant parameter estimates. The result in Table 5 shows that credit guarantee amount is a 
positive function of the size of firms. It is interpreted as smaller firms are given relatively less 
credit guarantee. Very likely the positive age association is due to improved security or higher 
asset size. We also examine credit guarantee amount with respect to 16 locations and 15 
industrial sectors using this model. On the average almost all locations, receive lower credit 
guarantee amount than Seoul serving as reference location. Among the industries, basic iron 
and steel, computers and office machinery, semiconductor and other electronic components 
and television and radio transmitters receive higher rate of guarantee, while software 
consultancy lower rate than the manufacture of pharmaceutical as reference industry. Supply 
of credit guarantee is increasingly negatively related to time. The decline might be attributed to 
recovery of the industry and reduced needs after the Asian financial crisis.  
As shown in Table 5, the negative but significant age coefficient indicates that the younger 
firms receive more credit guarantee amounts. However, it is found from the positive 
coefficient of the age squared that, accounting for initial 4 years of positive relationship, the 
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relation between age and credit guarantee is non-linear and characterized as U-shaped 
relationship. Looking at the frequency of number of firms receiving credit guarantee by age of 
firm shows a positive relationship before 4 years and a negative relationship thereafter. The 
credit guarantee measured in form of sum value show very similar patterns. This result 
coincides with the expectation that credit guarantees are preferentially distributed to the new 
entrants or growing firms. It is consistent with objectives of the guarantee system as well.  
As firms possess more intangible assets and new technologies with patents, they are found to 
receive more credit guarantees. The technology dummy shows that lenders consider 
technology as an important standard and preference is given to technology-based firms in 
evaluation of applications. All three technology related explanatory variables, intangible assets, 
patent and NTBF, are highly correlated in their impacts on credit guarantee amount. A 
duplication of receipt of guarantee from two sources as expected reduced the demand and 
supply of credit from each source. Total assets as security and operational capacity has a 
positive relationship with the guarantee amount received, as well has the ordinary R&D 
investment cost. Surprisingly the degree of indebtedness despite its negative effect has no 
significant effect. We also find that firms with higher CEO’s education level receive more 
amount of credit guarantee. The rate is increasing in the level of education. Finally, this model 
yields highly significant negative values with respect to time, positive with respect to size and 
mixed considering location and industry dummies.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5.3 Internal R&D investment 
The second model employing equation 2 is estimated by using net incomes before and after 
taxes, respectively. The results from both model specifications are listed in Table 6. Each 
model with R2 of 0.57 shows relatively good fit. This model aimed to find the differences in 
internal R&D investment using net income before and after taxes but the estimation results are 
almost the same from the two models.  
The dependent variable here is summation of firm’s ordinary and development costs. In 
addition we investigated whether the predicted credit guarantee amount obtained from 
equation (1) had effect on firms’ own R&D investment or not. Results suggest that in firms’ 
R&D investment, public credit guarantee frequency and amount and duplicated guarantees 
have positive influence. However, none are statistically significantly different from zero effect. 
The net income seems to have strong and positive effects. The amount of credit guarantee in 
conjunction with net income has positive effect on R&D investment. That is, the credit 
guarantee encourages firms to invest in R&D actively.  
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It is found that younger or recently established firms are more prawn to R&D investment and 
the relationship is characterized as an inverted U-shaped with respect to firm’s age. These 
results indicate that there exists an incentive effect of credit guarantee on firms’ R&D 
investments. Also, in the case that firms have more patents and they are selected as a new 
technology based firm, they invest more in R&D. The effect of patents is strongest among the 
explanatory variables. However, looking at the duplication of funds, receiving funds from 
KOTEC twice is found not to result in an increased R&D investment. The fact that the total 
share of equity has a negative and insignificant relation with the R&D investment is that credit 
guarantee fund generally goes into technology investment. 
Debt ratio denotes the ratio of the total liabilities to the total assets, and a higher such indicates 
smaller R&D investment. The number of times receiving credit guarantee fund as well as the 
amount of the fund do not have a significant influence. In addition, surprisingly as the net 
income of the firms increases, the firms’ R&D investment is reduced. The interactive variable 
(lcgalneti), which is the product of logarithm value of the credit guarantee amount and that of 
the net income of firms, is shown to have a positive relation with the R&D investment of firms.  
The level of CEOs education in an increasing form has positive impact on firms R&D 
investment. In looking at the development of R&D investment over time we note that only the 
last year, 2004, is higher compared with the first year, 2001. Results suggest a positive and 
increasing relationship between size of firms measured as number of employees and firms 
R&D investment activity. We observe significant heterogeneity in R&D behavior in regards 
with location of firms. Seoul as reference location seems to have a higher propensity to 
investment compared to most of other locations. The industrial sectors are also different in 
their R&D investment. The computer system design, manufacture of television industries and 
radio and manufacture of computer and office machinery show a high rate of R&D, while 
manufacture of iron and basic steel low R&D rate. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5.4 Death Valley and Survival of SMEs 
New technology-based firms have a crucial role to the economic development in Korea. 
However, these firms suffer from a ‘liability of newness’, and most emerging technology firms 
struggle to survive. Especially these firms’ problems are directly or indirectly related to their 
financing needs and sources. In general the new technology based start-ups of Korea are 
supported by public funds provided through the two national credit guarantee funds. The 
evidence show that the amount of public financing reduces as time elapses and in parallel 
private financing increase. The development include gap between the two sources where the 
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difference between the ending point of public financing and the starting point of private 
financing is referred to as ‘Death Valley’. Therefore, as the difference gets deeper and wider, 
the start-ups go through serious financial problems threatening their survival.  
A look at the distributional relationship between credit guarantee amounts received by firms 
and their total R&D investment shows that the credit guarantee and R&D investment lines 
cross at around 3 years age resulting into a Death Valley gap around 2-4 years of age. At this 
point we can find evidence of Death Valley among young firms with age below five years.  
Previous research has shown that survival and performance of SME is highly affected by 
access to credit guarantee. Few of these studies based on current data are reviewed below. 
These studies have good coverage on the exploitation of the information containing the data on 
survival of firms and use advanced methodology. Thus, instead of conducting survival analysis 
we briefly resent their main findings. 
Kang et al. (2008) studied the effect of credit guarantee policy on survival and performance of 
SMEs by using regression analysis method. The analysis shows that the size and age play a 
decisive role in survival and performance of firms. In addition to size and age the firms are 
also differentiated by industrial sector they participate in. High survival likelihood of old firms 
establishes that management experience was the critical factor in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis. Larger firms are also found superior in performance. This is explained by the 
fact that large firms accumulated growth potential by investment in R&D and innovative 
restructuring, while SMEs suffered from shortage of finances and loss of competitiveness.  
Oh et al. (2009) is another study that evaluates credit guarantee policy by adopting propensity 
score matching methodology. The authors evaluate the effect of the guarantee policy in terms 
of growth in size of the firm, R&D, investment, productivity, and survival of firms in the post 
crisis period, by comparing guaranteed with non-guaranteed firms. The results suggest that 
credit guarantees influenced significantly firms’ ability to maintain their size and it increased 
their survival rate. However, it did not increase their R&D, investment, growth and 
productivity. Due to the adverse selection problem, firms with lower productivity were 
receiving guarantees which made the process of creative destruction less effective in 
manufacturing. The policy was also criticized for its lack of effective selection mechanism and 
interference in the market mechanism with disturbing impacts on the restructuring plan leading 
to overcapacity among SMEs.  
In a third study Oh et al. (2009) conduct a comparative analysis of plant dynamics in the 
Korean manufacturing. The analysis is performed by size classes and sources of TFP growth 
are decomposed into entry, exit, and survival effects of plants. Additional survival analyses 
investigate internal and external determinants of the survival of plants. The results from chain 
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based productivity analysis indicate that the exit of SMEs with higher productivity is 
becoming problematic in the post-Asian crisis period. The improvements in large-scale 
establishments after the crisis appeared to occur in high-technology industrial sectors; while 
SMEs in low-technology industries are suffering from a sluggish market selection process. 
Kaplan Meier survival curve in Oh et al. (2009) show that export, R&D investment, and multi-
plant production enhance the survival rates of plants. However, export activities have the 
strongest effect followed by R&D. Cox regression of plant’s survival analysis suggests that 
both internal and external variables affect the survival of plants. GDP growth, R&D, export, 
multi-plant, and number of employees have a positive association with the survival of the 
plants. The sectoral growth implies that during the boom period, the entry rate and competition 
would increase, negatively affecting the survival rates of plants. The TFP level shows that the 
TFP level was not a very important factor for the survival of SMEs, but high productivity level 
was a very important factor for the survival of LSEs. 
The above discussion leads us to conclude that financial support for SMEs must be designed 
counter-cyclically, i.e., the amount of credit provision must gradually decrease in keeping with 
the progress of recovery from the crisis and economic boom. The support policy targeting 
SMEs must focus more on improved selection mechanism of firms requiring support. The 
objective must be to enhance productivity, not merely as a broader support measures. In 
allocation of scarce credit resources, preference must be given to firms with higher 
productivity rates in order to improve their survival rates. This will eventually enhance the 
productivity growth of the entire industry. In order to assist in the survival of SMEs, the 
government support must be such that it stimulates SMEs to initially begin with moderate size 
in order to avoid external risks and be able to compete in the market primarily with their 
internal resources ability. Policies promoting R&D and the export activities of firms can also 
assist to improve the survival rate of SMEs. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
In recent years, various kinds of public funds have been committed to SMEs in Korea, but 
their effects have not been evaluated effectively. In order to ensure effective management of 
such funds, evaluation of the effects and the feedback information from the previously 
invested public funds need to be utilized in the future selection of worthy recipient firms. 
In this paper we used a large firm level data to study how credit guarantee amount is 
determined and how it affects firms’ R&D investment. In analysis of the relationship between 
duration of credit and firm’s survival and performance, we segment in several characteristics 
of firms such as industrial sector, technology level, firm size, age, financial status, ownership, 
15 
 
location and industrial sector. Finally we look into elasticity of credit fund and R&D 
investment of firms with respect to several firm characteristics.  
Through this exercise, we found the factors determining the level of credit guarantee and in-
house R&D, which include development and R&D investment costs, and their interaction, 
especially the tradeoff between the two and how they form the Death Valley. The results we 
obtain are from a sample of firms which requested credit guarantees form one or two credit 
guarantee funds during the period 2001 to 2004. The impact of credit guarantees on R&D of 
SMEs in Korea is analyzed at covering the economic recovery period of post the Asian 
economic crisis.  
Estimation of model with determinants of credit guarantee amount led us to identification of 
several such determinants. The age of firms show to have a negative effect at a decreasing rate 
as older firm use international sources of finances and have well established relation with the 
financial market. High levels of total assets and intangible share are positively associated with 
the amount credit guarantee. Number of patents, NTBF and education of the CEO also 
impacted positively the amount. We find positive relationship between size of firm and credit 
guarantee suggesting the small firms to have limited access to R&D investment finances. It 
must be explained by their small size and lack of organization and research capacity.  
In order to measure the effect of credit guarantees on research, the relationship between credit 
guarantee and R&D investment of firms is analyzed. The amount and frequency of credit 
guarantee provisions have positive effects on R&D expenditures of SMEs but it is not 
statistically significant. The distribution of receiving firms show that about 55% of firms have 
operated less than five years and 82% of firms less than ten years. Also 83% of firms belong to 
new technology based firm category. Based on these we find that the credit guarantee support 
is concentrated on younger firms. The ratio of credit guarantee amounts to total assets is 
positively correlated with R&D investment. The statistics clearly shows that the amount of 
credit guarantee and R&D cost is gradually increasing during the early years of firm's 
operation. The amounts peak at the 3rd year for the credit guarantee and at the 5th year for in-
house R&D cost, respectively. Therefore, it seems clear that a large amount of resources are 
spent for the R&D during the first 5 years of establishment of firms. However, the shape of 
credit guarantee and R&D investment indicates that credit guarantee amount decreases steeply. 
The data show that age is a crucial factor to the level and relationship between credit guarantee 
and R&D investment of firms.   
The emergence of new technology-based firms affects economic development positively. 
However, new organizations in general and new technology-based firms in particular, suffer 
from a ‘liability of newness’, and most emerging technology firms struggle to survive. 
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Especially these problems are affected by the financing source. In general the new technology 
based start-ups are supported by public funds. However, the amount of financing reduces as 
time elapses and private financing increase. The difference between the ending point of public 
financing and the starting point of private financing gets deeper and wider, as the start-ups face 
financial problems. This shows evidence of Death Valley among young firms.  
As revealed in other studies patent, assets, employees and total stock share of equity play a 
decisive role in provision of credit guarantee and its amount as well as the R&D investment of 
firms. The amount of guarantee and R&D investment differ over time, across industries, and 
locations. This result is in favor of government policy which aimed at balancing the economic 
development. Therefore, the total amount and distribution of credit guarantee allocated to 
firms should be aligned with politics targeting to balance the development and firm dynamics 
at the national level.  
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Table 1. Development of credit guarantee amount over time and by fund (billion won).  
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
KCGF 11,329 21,454 19,621 22,592 31,268 32,514 32,734 
KOTEC 5,724 11,340 11,306 12,498 16,161 16,523 16,746 
Total 17,053 32,794 30,927 35,090 47,429 49,037 49,480 
 Note: Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) and Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund (KOTEC) 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of variables. 
Variable Description  
Year 2001-2004 
CGamount The amount of credit guarantee 
Inhouse Develop costs + ordinary cost 
Age Age of firms 
IntangShare Intangible assets 
Patent Holding patent or not 
NTBF New tech based firm or not 
TotAssets Total assets 
Employee The number of employees 
DEratio Total Liabilities /total assets 
NetIncome Net income 
Tax Income taxes 
TotShEqu Total stockholders' equity 
CGnumber Number of credit guarantee 
CGamount The amount of credit guarantee 
CgaNeti CGamount x NetIncome 
CEOedu CEO education (high value has more school career) 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, 2001-2004, 45,749 observations. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  
Credit Guarantee amount 337.6999 835.3139  
In-house R&D investment 84.7303 426.2624  
Age 6.6930 5.3147  
Intangible share 0.0372 0.1077  
Patent 0.2998 0.4582  
NTBF 0.8270 0.3781  
Total assets 2383.0000 7599.0000  
Employee 22.4300 39.4544  
Debt-Equity ratio 0.5571 0.2740  
Net income 57.3947 818.2582  
Tax 74.2279 941.4965  
Total Share Equity 816.3480 2836.0000  
 
 
Table 4. Three-digit classification of industries 
Industrial code Industry  
242 Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Chemicals and Botanical Products 
300 Manufacture of Computers and Office Machinery 
321 Manufacture of Semiconductor and Other Electronic Components 
322 
Manufacture of Television and Radio Transmitters and Apparatuses for  
Line Telephony and Line Telegraphy 
331 Manufacture of Medical Appliances and Instruments 
721 Computer System Design and Consultancy 
722 Software Consultancy and Supply 
241 Manufacture of Basic Chemicals 
243 Manufacture of Other Chemical Products 
244 Manufacture of Man-Made Fibers 
252 Manufacture of Plastic Products 
271 Manufacture of Basic Iron and Steel 
291 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 
343 Manufacture of Parts and Accessories for Motor Vehicles and Engine 
 
 
22 
 
 
Table 5. Parameter estimates from Model 1 of determinants of credit guarantee amount.    
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 2.5682***  0.0210  122.61 0.0001 
Age -0.0100***  0.0017  -5.94 0.0001 
Age2 0.0002***  0.0001  4.00 0.0001 
Intangible share of assets 0.1581***  0.0400  3.95 0.0001 
Patent 0.1426***  0.0094  15.10 0.0001 
NTBF 0.1287***  0.0110  11.71 0.0001 
Duplication -0.1230***  0.0079  -15.60 0.0001 
Log Total Assets 0.3542***  0.0032  111.22 0.0001 
Log Ordinary R&D cost 0.0394***  0.0033  11.89 0.0001 
Debt/Equity ratio -0.0084           0.0156  -0.53 0.5932 
CEO edu2 0.0867***  0.0083  10.51 0.0001 
CEO edu3 0.2071***  0.0149  13.87 0.0001 
T2002 -0.0417***  0.0099  -4.20 0.0001 
T2003 -0.1072***  0.0097  -11.10 0.0001 
T2004 -0.2393***  0.0119  -20.04 0.0001 
size2 0.3501***  0.0107  32.76 0.0001 
size3 0.6715***  0.0173  38.78 0.0001 
size4 0.9683***  0.0249  38.92 0.0001 
size5 1.2186***  0.0671  18.16 0.0001 
R2 0.5358  
RMSE 0.7950  
Observation 45749  
The model included dummy variables for 17 locations and 15 industrial sectors. Robust standard erroes. 
 
23 
 
 
Table 6. Parameter estimates from Model 2 for determinants of own R&D.   
 Using net income AFTER tax  Using net income BEFORE tax 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
t-value pPr > |t| 
Parameter  
Estimate 
Std.  
Error 
t-value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -1.5368*** 0.0609  -25.23 0.0001 -1.5448***  0.0609  -25.37 0.0001 
Age  0.0278*** 0.0031  9.06 0.0001  0.0283***  0.0031  9.22 0.0001 
Age2 -0.0010*** 0.0001  -9.67 0.0001 -0.0010***  0.0001  -9.81 0.0001 
Patent  0.8027*** 0.0167  48.05 0.0001  0.8025***  0.0167  48.04 0.0001 
NTBF  0.0909*** 0.0196  4.64 0.0001  0.0888***  0.0196  4.53 0.0001 
Duplication  0.0145 0.0141  1.03 0.3048  0.0158  0.0141  1.12 0.2628 
Intangible Share  8.4243*** 0.0722  116.74 0.0001  8.4108***  0.0722  116.46 0.0001 
Log TotShEqu -0.0205 0.0107  -1.91 0.0559 -0.0176  0.0107  -1.64 0.1017 
Log Total Assets  0.3240*** 0.0130  24.98 0.0001  0.3235***  0.0130  24.95 0.0001 
Debt/Equ ratio -0.7124*** 0.0437  -16.31 0.0001 -0.7044***  0.0437  -16.11 0.0001 
CGnumber  0.0063 0.0092  0.68 0.4963  0.0061  0.0093  0.66 0.5065 
Log CGamount  0.0170 0.0127  1.34 0.1809  0.0183  0.0127  1.44 0.1492 
Log netincome -0.1598*** 0.0164  -9.73 0.0001 -0.1609***  0.0162  -9.94 0.0001 
Log cga x logneti  0.0240*** 0.0028  8.45 0.0001  0.0234***  0.0028  8.40 0.0001 
CEO edu2  0.1540*** 0.0147  10.47 0.0001  0.1538***  0.0147  10.46 0.0001 
CEO edu3  0.5959*** 0.0266  22.40 0.0001  0.5936***  0.0266  22.31 0.0001 
T2002 -0.0022 0.0176  -0.12 0.9013 -0.0018  0.0176  -0.10 0.9192 
T2003  0.0103 0.0172  0.60 0.5500  0.0111  0.0172  0.65 0.5178 
T2004  0.1223*** 0.0213  5.74 0.0001  0.1231***  0.0213  5.77 0.0001 
size2  0.3099*** 0.0192  16.14 0.0001  0.3111***  0.0192  16.20 0.0001 
size3  0.6651*** 0.0316  21.03 0.0001  0.6674***  0.0316  21.10 0.0001 
size4  0.9104*** 0.0458  19.90 0.0001  0.9116***  0.0458  19.91 0.0001 
size5  1.4668*** 0.1206  12.16 0.0001  1.4698***  0.1206  12.18 0.0001 
R2 0.5722  0.5723  
RMSE 1.4122  1.4121  
Observations 45749 45749 
The models included dummy variables for 17 locations and 15 industrial sectors. Robust standard errors. 
 
